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NONFINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY AND EVICTION
STANDARDS IN 'PUBLIC HOUSING-
THE PROBLEM FAMILY IN THE
GREAT SOCIETY
improvement of housing for low-income families has been a fed-
eral objective since 1937.1 A dozen years later Congress declared its
intent to realize "cas soon as feasible ... the goal of a decent home and
a suitable living environment for every American family .... -"2 but
many American families today have neither. The Report of The Presi-
dent's National Commission on Civil Disorders, in recommending the
construction of 600,000 publicly assisted units in 1968 and 6,000,000
units within five years,3 merely emphasized the obvious: past efforts at
public housing have fallen short of initial expectations. There are, how-
ever, more than 2,000,000 people presently living in low-rent public
housing.4 For slum dwellers keekihg admittance to public housing, and
for present government tenants, the procedural and substantive stan-
dards governing their admission or continued tenancy spell the differ-
ence between decent shelter and total frustration.5
Eligibility and eviction standards are determined by the local
housing authority.6 The only federal eligibility requirements are that
1 Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
2 Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 413, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
3 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMm'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 475 (Bantam ed. 1967).
This goal, too, appears overambitious. The probability of the Commission's recommenda-
tions gaining either presidential or congressional acceptance is minimal unless the Viet-
nam War ends. Even then there is little likelihood that the goal could be reached. "It
seems impossible-based on past performance-to build any part of 600,000 new publicly
assisted units this coming year; and only a fraction of 6,000,000 are possible in five
years." Lowe, What White America Must Do, SATURDAY REV., Mar. 16, 1968, at 26.
4 Friedman, Government and Slum Housing: Some General Considerations, 32 LAw
g. CONTEMP. PROB. 357, 361 (1967). New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York
City sponsor additional nonfederally assisted low-rent public housing programs. Rosen,
Tenants' Rights in Public Housing, in HOUSING FOR THE POOR: RIGHTs AND REMEDIEs 154
(N.Y.U. School of Law Project on Social Welfare, Supp. 1, 1967).
5 The rent's $70 a month and the whole building's crawling with roaches and
rats. The plaster is falling down. It ain't fit for dogs. But what can you do? My
wife's always trying to get into one of those projects, but they won't let us in until
I get a steady job. So we're always finding ourselves right where we started-
nowhere.
Parks, The Cycle of Despair, LIFE, Mar. 8, 1968, at 47, 50 (from an interview by Gordon
Parks with Norman Fontanelle, Sr., of Harlem).
0 The express policy of Congress is "to vest in the local public housing agencies the
maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of the low-rent housing pro-
gram . . . " Housing Act of 1959, § 501, 73 Stat. 680, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964). The same
policy is followed in New York. N.Y. PUn. HousING LAW § 37(1)(w) (McKinney 1955).
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the tenants constitute a "family" and that'the applicant S incme be l.ess
than an approved maximum limit.7 Similarly, over-income is the sole
ground for termination under federal law.8 However, local authorities
have not restricted themselves to these areas in determining admission
and eviction criteria; instead they have formulated unrealitic policies
which appear to contradict the goals of public housing. For ex aple,
many states deny public housing to families with illegitimate children,9
despite congressional intent to aid every American family, and despite
the fact that nearly one-quarter of current Negro births are illegiti-
mate.'0
Such irrational classifications breed lawsuits, but there are thresh-
old procedural problems. Can the determination be appealed? Is tlere
standing to sue? Recent developments indicate that at least minimum
due process will be afforded those aggrieved by the loc4l authority. The
safeguards of notice and opportunity to be heard, however, :do not
reach the more basic issue of whether the substantive standards adopted
by the local authority are just. Such a determination can be made only
4fter examining present "desirability" standards, the unique circum-
stances of the problem family, and the proper role of public housing.
L
ELIGIBILITY AND EVICTION PROCEDURES-SECURING DUE PROCESS
Professor Reich, commenting on te wide ,discretion afforded local
housing authorities in deciding on the -admission of tenants, found
existing standards generally vague, with no clearly estabished methods
of proof." Moreover, he found "little in the way of procedure to make
certain that the auhorities' ,frmi is'true."' 2Athough published
standards may be vague, more detailed standards certainly exist. Local
authorities mpst adopt some criteria f6r choosing a limited number of
acceptances from an enormous number of applical t, Although the
I 42 U.$.C. § 1402 (1964). "Fe4eral law makes relatively few "denpdfs on administra-
don, insisting Only that only poor persons be allqcVed in public housing." "riedman,
Pulic Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CALI. L. REV. 642, 656 (1966).
8 42 U.S.C, § 1410(g)(3) (1964).
9 See, e.g., Thomas v. Housing Auth., 35 U.S.L.W. 2722 (E.D; A.. May -26, 1967);
Williams v. Housing Auth., 228 Ga. 407, 155 S.2d, 923 (1967).
1Q L. WINW4TER . W. Y.NCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITIC -OF CON-
T-ovEasY 5 (1967).
11 Reich, Individual Rights and Sodal Welfare: The Emerging .Lega. Issues, 74
YALE LJ. 1245, 1250 (1965).
12 id.
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federal statute's and the federal contributions contract 14 require pro-
mulgation and publication of admission policies, "[l]ack of enforcement
of the obligation . . .has resulted in a widespread pattern of secret
standards."' 5 A recent study of the procedures of the New York City
Housing Authority suggests that the only way to overcome the com-
pounded lack of evidentiary standards, notice, and opportunity to rebut
in the admissions process is by a suit in mandamus, or its equivalent,
on due process and equal protection grounds.16 This solution is neither
practical nor readily available for the average slum resident.
Eviction procedures are only slightly less secret and arbitrary.
Although judicial review of evictions in more common than review of
rejections, the courts have generally upheld the eviction for any reason
so long as the local authority followed the eviction procedures estab-
lished in the leas'e.Y Two cases demonstrate the refusal of the courts
to adjust the traditional landlord-tenant matrix to the goals of public
Is 42 U.S.C. § 1401(g)(2) (1964).
14 Public Housing Admin., Consolidated Annual Contribution Contract, Part I,
§ 12(A)(1)(206) (PHA-3010, April 1966). This is the basic document providing federal
funds for the local authorities.
15 Rosen, supra note 4, at 166.
16 Id. at 167-81. See Manigo v. New York City Housing Auth., 51 Misc. 2d 829, 273
N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd mem., 27 App. Div. 2d 803, 279 N.YS.2d 1014 (Ist
Dep't), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1008 (1967). The lower court published the standards used
to find Mrs. Manigo ineligible on -grounds of undesirability. A tenant or applicant is
undesirable if his family constitutes:
(1) a detriment to the health, safety or morals of its neighbors or the com-
munity, (2) an adverse influence upon sound family and community life, (3) a
source of danger to the peaceful occupation of the other tenants, (4) a source
of danger or cause of damage, to the premises or property of the Authority, or
(5) a nuisance. In making such determination consideration shall be given to
the family composition, parental control over children, family stability, medical
and other past history, reputation, conduct and behavior, criminal record, if
any, occupation of wage earners, and any other data or information with respect
to the family that has a bearing upon its desirability, including its conduct or
behavior while residing in a project.
Id. at 831, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 1004 (emphasis added). The detailed standards which imple-
ment these general considerations are discussed infra at pp. 1129-31.
17 The standard operating procedure-for public housing evictions is a one-montti
notice requirement in the lease. "The landlord or the tenant may each terminate this
lease and tenancy at the end of any monthly term by giving to the other one calendar
month's prior notice in writing." N.Y. City Housing Auth., Resident Monthly Lease
Agreement (NYCHA Form 040.001, rev. May, 1959). "This lease may be terminated by
the Tenant at any time by giving 15 days written notice. The notice must be in writing
and delivered to the management office. This lease may also be terminated by the Man-
agement at any time by the giving of written notice not less than 80 days prior to
termination. No reason need be stated for such termination . . . ." Housing and Redev.
Auth. in and for the City of Minneapolis Dwelling Lease, reprinted in NATIONAL AssOC.
OF HousiNO & REn'v. OFFIcIALs, PUBLIc HOUSING Is THE TENANTs A-59 to A-60 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as PUBUC HousNG Is TnsE T nArs].
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housing. In Brand v. Chicago Housing Authority, 8 the- defendant
sought to reduce income maximums and to evict plaintiff-tenant on
grounds of over-income. Dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint was
affirmed on the ground that "[a]ny property right acquired by the
plaintiffs was circumscribed by the terms and conditions upon which
[the lease] was founded."' 9 The housing authority in Walton v. City of
Phoenix20 brought an action of forcible entry and detainer against
"undesirable" tenants. In affirming a decision for the authority, the
Arizona Supreme Court equated it with a private landlord, implying
the power to "impose reasonable restrictions on the use of the privilege
so granted .... -121 There has been one area, however, where the courts
have not hesitated to look beyond the terms of the lease to determine
if due process and equal protection were being denied. Under the terms
of the now-expired Gwinn Amendment,22 any member of an organiza-
tion listed as subversive by the Attorney General was barred from
public housing. Under the amendment's case law, housing authorities
are treated not asprivate landlords, but rather as public bodies subject
to due process and equal protection requirements. 23 Another limitation
on housing authority actions appears in the Gwinn Amendment cases;
although there is no constitutional right of tenancy, no unconstitutional
requirement can be made a condition of continued occupancy.24 Al-
though these cases received notice,25 courts have repeatedly refused to
analogize from them, upholding instead the "right" of the authorities
under lease provisions to terminate without giving a reason.26
18 120 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1941).
19 Id. at 788.
20 69 Ariz. 26, 208 P.2d 309 (1949).
21 Id. at 31, 208 P.2d at 311-12; accord, Chicago Housing Auth. v. Ivory, 341 Ill. App.
282, 93 N.E.2d 386 (1950).
22 Act of July 31, 1953, ch. 302, 67 Stat. 307.
23 Actions not consistent with due process and equal protection were held beyond
the power of the local authority. Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883,
279 P.2d 215 (Super. Ct. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956). See also Rudder v. United
States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Kutcher v. Housing Auth., 20 NJ. 181, 119 A.2d 1
(1955).
24 Chicago Housing Auth. v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954). See also
Lawson v. Housing Auth., 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955).
25 See Williams, Tenant's Loyalty Oaths, 31 NoTm DAME LAw. 190 (1956); Note,
The Gwinn Amendment: Practical and Constitutional Problems in Its Enforcement, 104
U. PA. L. REv. 694 (1956).
26 Pittsburgh Housing Auth. v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963). In
New York City Housing Auth. v. Russ, I Misc. 2d 170, 134 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1954)
the court held that it was "unnecessary for the landlord to offer any testimony as to the
objectionable behavior of the tenant to make out a prima facie case. . . . When the
landlord Authority terminated the lease in accordance with the authority vested in it by
1968] 1125
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The power tp evict withoit offering any competent evidence of
undesirability was upheld in New York ity, Houng 4uthQrity v.
Watson,27 although respondents won a strong dissent.2 8 Eviction proce-
dures have remained essentially immune to effective judicial review.
Similarly, administrative remedies are limited. In a c .e involving an
injunction against eviction and mandamus for a hearing, a New York
court held that there is no right to a hearing; and where one is gratlxi-
tously made available, its use in every case may not be required.2 9
Where formal eviction procedures, including a hearing, have been
established, their operative character is not likely to resemble familiar
administrative due process8 0
Recent developments, however, indicate a trend toward correcting
such administrative failings. In early 1967 the Department of Housing
and Urban Development issued a circular intended to combat growing
dissatisfaction with eviction practices and req4iring notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard, enumeration of charges, and maintenance of full
records.3 ' Aside from dubious enfQrceability, the value of the circular
the laws of this State, the trial court Ihad no authority- to refuse to issue the final order
in favor of the landlord." Id. at 171, 134 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
27 27 Misc. 2d 61$, 207 N.Y.S. 2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
2$ Id. at 623, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
29 Smalls v. White Plains Housing Auth., 34 Misc. 2d 949, 230 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct.
1962). "The court should only interfere when the determination made was one that no
reasonable mind coald ieach."' Id. at 952, 23Q N.Y.S.d at 109.
80 For an examination of the weaksses of the New York City Housing Authority's
Tenant Review Board procedures, see Rosen, supra note 4, at 217-23. The Board defines
undesirability as conduct or behavior constituting: (1) a detriment to the health, safety
or morals of the neighborhood or community; (2) an adverse influence upon sound family
and community life; (3) a source of danger or cause of damage to the premises or property
of the Apthority; (4) a source of danger to the peaceful occupation of the other tenants;
(5) a nuisance. M d. at 219. See also note 16 supra.
31 The circular states, in part:
Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe it is essential that no tenant
be given notice to vacate without being told by the local authority, in a private
conference or other appropriate manner, the reasons for the eviction, and given
an opportunity to make sucih reply or explanation as he may wish.
In addition to informing the tenant of the reason(s) for any proposedl eviction
action, from this date each Local Authority shall maintain a written record of
every eviction from the federally assisted public hotlsing. Such records ae to be
available for reviev frou tine to time by HUD representatives and shall contain
the following information:
1. Name of tenant and identification of unit occupied.
2. Date of notice to vacate.
3. Specific reason(s) for notice to vacate. For example, if a tenant is being
evicted because of undesirable actions, the record should detail the actions
which resulted in the determination that eyiction should be instituted.
4. Date and method of notifying tenant with summary of any conferences
with tenant, including names of conference partipipants.
5. Date and descfiption of final action taken.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Circular, Feb. 7, 1967.
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is impaired because of the vagueness of its language. It yields no clear-
cut standards for determining valid reasons for eviction or for determin-
ing what shall constitute an appropriate heaning.32
Although the Department has rule-making power under the hous-
ing acts,33 a precatory statement that it "believe[s] it is essential" may
signal a non-binding request that the broad discretion of the local
authority be more fairly exercised. In Thorpe v.Housing Authority (f
Durham,34 the United States Supreme Court vacated a judgment of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina as k result of the circular, remanding
for further cohsideration beloW. The Court deferred judgment as to
"[t]he legal effect of the circular, the extent to which it binds local
housing authbrities, and whether it is in fact applicable to the peti-
tioner . . ."35 On remand, the Supreme Court of Nofth Carolina
affirmed its prior decision, holding only that the circular was not retto-
active. 6 Thus, both courts avoided passing on the legal efficacy of the
circular. The question will not remain unanswered ince certiorari has
again been granted in Thorpe, dnd other cases also ate testing the cir-
ctilar's effect.3 7 Moreover, if local authorities choose to ignore the
circular, it is likely that its provisions would be added to the annual
contributions contract, which is binding on the local authorities.
The eventual form of the hearing will probably be determined
only by a process of trial and error at the local level. The growing
litigiousness of the poor-fostered by the swelling ranks of poor-people's
lawyers-should encourage at least minimum due process in the im-
mediate future.
Although significant problems remain, there has been a major
change of official attitude Which will undoubtedly produce wider tenant
rights. Gaining procedural due process, however, will be a hollow vic-
tory for the publicly-houised poor unless rational and meaningful sub-
stantive standards are formulated.
3 11 W ruan LAW BuLL. 5 (Jan. 1968).
33 42 U.S.C. § 1468 (964).
34 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
35 886 U.S. at 673 n.4. The petitioner claimed that she was being evricted for political
activity. Her request for a hearing was denied, and notice of the reason for eviction was
not given. See Jusike DOuglas' concurring opinion for a full statement of the facts, 886
U.S. Et 674-77.
3b3 271 N.C. 468, 157 S.E.d 147 (i967) cert. gianied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3345 (May 28, 1968).
37 11 WEL.nA LAw BuLL. 5 (Jan. 1968). At least one court has apparently already
determined the binding quality of the circular. See Williams v. Housing Auth., 223 Ga.
407, 155 S.E.2d 923 (1957). A recent New York case requires state housing authorities to
give "a reasonable ground for termifiation" despite a contrary lease provision. Vinson v.
Greenburgh Housing Ahth., 36 U.S.L.W. 2651, 2652 (App. DIv. 2d bep't March 11, 19).
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II
SUBSTANTIVE ELIGIBILITY AND EvICTION STANDARDS
A. Present Standards-"Desirability" As the Test for Shelter
Although the original clientele of public housing was "poor but
honest workers," today's residents are more likely to be paupers.3 8 This
shift has led local authorities to adopt screening procedures establishing
preference categories whereby only a few tenants can be accepted from
many applicants. Medical, occupational, and behavioral histories are
regularly used to determine eligibility.39 Similarly, eviction standards,
formal or informal, are patterned on "nondesirability" lines. Illegiti-
macy,40 narcotics addiction,41 arrest of a family member,4 and miscon-
duct of children 43 are typical determinants of nondesirability.
It can be argued that nondesirability should play no part in tenant
selection or eviction. A New York municipal court judge has said, "It
is not for the landlord to commend, condone or condemn a tenant's
actions or to sit in public judgment upon his morals."44 On the other
hand, the authority cannot be expected to submit its other tenants or its
property to obvious danger through a first-come-first-served policy, or
through standing by idly in the face of gross abuse of its facilities. A
second possible objection to desirability standards, at least as applied
38 See Friedman, supra note 7, at 648-49.
39 The New York City Housing Authority uses three categories "to create for its
tenants an environment conducive to healthful living, family stability, sound family and
community relations and proper upbringing of children."
A. Where in the course of processing an application, information pertaining
to the composition of the family and to its conduct and behavior indicates that
it will conform with the Authority's objective, the family shall be declared eligible
for admission.
B. Where the information reveals behavior which represents a "Clear and
Present Danger" to other tenants, the family shall be declared ineligible.
C. Where the information reveals behavior which does not represent a
"Clear and Present Danger" but which includes indications of potential prob-
lems, the family shall be considered eligible; however, further evaluation of
each family shall be made before a final decision as to eligibility is reached.
N.Y. City Housing Auth., Management Directive GM-1287 (Nov. 29, 1961) [hereinafter
cited as GM-1287]. The directive sets forth more detailed standards for applying the
categories. See pp. 1129-34 infra.
40 See Williams v. Housing Auth., 223 Ga. 407, 155 S.E.2d 923 (1967).
41 See In re Sanders v. Cruise, 10 Misc. 2d 533, 173 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
42 See New York City Housing Auth. v. Watson, 27 Misc. 2d 618, 207 N.Y.S.2d 920
(Sup. Ct. 1960).
43 See Smalls v. White Plains Housing Auth., 34 Misc. 2d 949, 230 N.Y.S.2d 106
(Sup. Ct. 1962).
44 New York City Housing Auth. v. Kelsey (unreported case in the N.Y. City Mun.
Ct. May 1, 1954). For a discussion of the case see 11 J. HoUSING 278 (1954).
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to the federal program, is that the fact of variance from state to state
violates equal protection guarantees. But because public housing cannot
serve every potentially eligible person, there must be some selection.
This does not mean that eligibility and eviction standards are beyond
the scope of equal protection. There must be a fair chance to partici-
pate for all those eligible, and the techniques used must be consistent
with congressional intent and agency regulations. 5 The "fairness" of
local standards must be judged in light of the broad purpose of the acts
-housing the poor.
Desirability standards can be justified only if reasonably related to
sheltering the poor; but by their very nature, such standards ignore the
question of housing need. The desperation of slum life is often reflected
in the types of antisocial activity specifically categorized as earmarks of
nondesirability. Thus, those families who are probably in the greatest
need of shelter are the least desirable. For example, substandard hous-
ing is an important causal element in family instability.4 Yet, the
instability of the family unit is expressly made a condition indicative of
potential problems by the New York City Housing Authority.47 Simi-
larly, although a slum resident has little initiative, money or talent for
repairing his slum home, "grossly unacceptable housekeeping" consti-
tutes a "dear and present danger" under the same set of standards.48
Likewise, overcrowding can lead to repeated friction with neighbors,
another of the "dear and present danger" standards.49
Membership in a violent teenage gang,5" highly irregular work
history,51 apparent mental retardation of any member of the family,52
and poor housekeeping standards including lack of furniture,53 are
treated as indicative of "potential problems" by the New York au-
thority.
45 See Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALBANY L. REV.
210 (1967). "A construction of section 27 which would enable the housing authority to
prescribe conditions of eligibility having no rational connection with the purpose of the
act would raise serious constitutional questions." Chicago Housing Auth. v. Blackman, 4
Ill. 2d 319, 326, 122 N.E.2d 522, 526 (1954).
46 Foster & Freed, Unequal Protection: Poverty & Family Law, 42 IND. L.J. 192, 196
(1967).
47 GM-1287, supra note 39, at 4.
48 "Applicants who in their present or past housing have created a fire hazard, have
damaged the premises and the equipment or have adversely affected neighbors by caus-
ing infestation or foul odors, are to be considered a 'Clear and Present Danger.'" Id. at 3.
49 Id. at 3.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 6.
52 Id.
53 Itd.
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Involvement in illegal activities within five years of application
for admission is considered a "dear and present danger." 54 Under this
standard, the husband and three children ot a twenty-tvo year old
Woman who, at age seventeen, Was arrested but hever convicted of
prostitution, could be denied admission on this ground alone. Evidence
of ieformation or of the cirdumstances surrounding the arrest Would be
irrelevant. The same result could be reached where a family member
wag arrested for looting during a riot. If vieWed as "evidence that An
individual is prone to violence," the applicant would be denied admis
sior as a "clear and present danger." 55 Even if the authority viewed the
act as merely "evidence of antisocial behavior," the applicant would
be categorized a "potential problem."56 In Manigo v. New York City
Housing Authority57 the criminal record of the applicant's husband
was held sufficient grounds to deny admission, although his only con-
viction was for disorderly conduct. Prior adjudications of juvenile delin-
quent and youthful offender status were viewed by the court as indica-
tive of a continuous basic pattern of misbehavior sufficient to deny
admission, 58 The decision can be viewed as amending the authority's
standards so that single or even scattered arrests or convictions, not
really indicative of a continuing pattern of misconduct, are no longer a
sufficient basis for denial of admission. As applied to evictions, the
reasonableness of a rule against illegal actions by a family member is
questionable. In New York City Housing Authority -v. Watson,59 the
father of the tenant family was convicted of a crime and imprisoned.
The family was served with notice of eviction, but the trial court denied
the authority's petition for possession.6° The appellate court reversed
holding that undesirability was not an issue for the court.6 A strident
dissenter attacked the complete irrationality of the policy, terming the
action of the housing authority "arbitrary" and "injust,"62 He found a
54 Where a member of the family was engaged in or was convicted for prostitu-
tion, sale of narcotics, professional gambling or mahufacture or sale of illegal
articles such as zip guns, the family is to be c6nsidered a "Clear and lresent
Danger," provided that the involvement ii sufh activities or the conviction oc-
curied ithin the past five years.
Id. at 2.
55 Id.
66 Id. at 4.
57 51 Misc. 2d 829, 273 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1966), affd mem., 27 App. Div. 2d
803, 279 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Ist DJp't), cirt. denied, 389 U.§. 1008 (1967).
58 See 3 WELFAEA LAw BuLL. 4 (Apr. 1966); 5 Wr.LFAR LAw BULL. 7 (Oct i966).
59 27 Misc. 2d 618, 207 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
60 23 Misc. 2d 408, 189 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1959).
61 27 Misc. 2d at 618, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
62 Id. at 622, 207 N.Y.S2d at 924.
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violation of the statutory purpose of the authority since "[4]r1 act in-
tended to provide housing for the poor is mis.used when a family is
driven from its home for no better reason than that it had been sorely
afflicted. Neither reason nor principle requires us to make a mockery
of the law."gP The case raises an interesting proble. If the husband
had been sentenced to ninety-nine years imprisonment, could eviction
be rationalized on any grounds? The husband could not disrupt the
neighborhood, and his family could not cons titutipnally be adjudged
guilty by association. This reluctance of the local authorities to place
reason over unblinking obedience to procedure is further demQo-
strated by the action of the local unit in In re Sanders v. Cruise.64 After
the tenants' adult son, a nonresident of the project, was acjudged a
narcotics addict, the authority issued an eviction order. The court
measured the fact of drug addictio4 against the five grounds for eviction
for nondesirability and concluded that the authority's action "exceeds
any reasonable requirement for the peaceful ocupancy of the project
and for the preservation of property."6 Thus, the reasonableness tet
has been effectively applied in at least one New Yprk case.
Perhaps the most patently arbitrary standard now in use is the bar
against families with illegitimate children.Q6 At present, there is a con-
flict among the district courts cQncerning the standard's constitution-
ality with njmerous suits pressing the matter.QT The case most likely to
be followed, because of its thoughtful analysis of the problem, is
Thomas v. Housing Authority of Little Rock.qB Two unwed mothers
challenged the local exclusion policy in a class action. Finding only
minimal eligibility requirements in the federal statutory and contrac-
tual provisions, the court examined the policy in relation to the state
statutes, the goals of the low-rent housing program, and the proper
operation of the project. Although the "unwed mother policy doubtless
had the elimination of sexual misconduct as its object," the court re-
jected the policy because of its inflexibility and violation of the aims of
public housing.69
63 Id. at 623, 2Q7 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
64 10 Misc. 2d 533, 173 N.Y.S2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
65 Id. at 537, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 875 (emphasis added).
66 For an excellent discussion of the illegitimacy'standard, see Rosen, supra note 4,
at 227-42.
67 Id.
68 35 U.S.L.W. 2722 (E.D. Ark., May 26, 1967).
69 The fatal vices are its inflexibility and general disharmony with the spirit and
aim of the low-rent housing program.... It overlooks the possibility of reform
and of benefits that may be derived from better surroundings. Automatic exclu-
sion is drastic beyond any reasonable necessity in the context in which it was
promulgated.
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Another case, however, upholds eviction for failure to comply with
a lease provision requiring birth reports. 7 0 Reasonable criticism of such
a result can be made on several grounds. Illegitimacy does not affect the
decency, safety or sanitary nature of the accommodations-Congress'
concern; the housing authority has no proper concern with the private
lives of its tenants, especially their sexual behavior. Also, such a policy
ignores the fact that one quarter of Negro births are illegitimate.71
Finally, any implication that additional discipline problems arise in
one-parent families overlooks the fact that one-third of public housing
families are presently one-parent families.72 The policy is also undercut
by the strong possibility that such families have no harmful effect upon
a neighborhood except in the case of overcrowded, substandard hous-
ing.73 It makes little sense to deprive a poor family of perhaps its only
comfort-decent housing-because the extra mouth to feed belongs to a
bastard rather than a legitimate child.
Common law marriage is another example of irrationality in eligi-
bility standards. Much has been written concerning the effect of our
antiquated welfare laws on marriage by low-income Negroes.7 4 The
Los Angeles Housing Authority treats common law marriage as
grounds for denial of admission although it recognizes that "common-
law marriage is not, in and of itself, indicative of an unstable family
situation."7 5 The authority bases its policy on two grounds: (1) failure
of state law to recognize the legality of such marriages, and (2) a provi-
sion in the annual contributions contract requiring a family unit but
The court wishes to emphasize that . . .[i]t is not holding that the federal
Constitution, the Public Housing Act, state statutes, or the federal-state contract
require the authority to permit the facility to be operated as a brothel. The
authority is not required to tolerate criminal activity within the facilities, or
disorderly conduct, or conduct amounting to abuse, or which seriously violates
ordinary standards of decency.
Id. at 2723. While this restricts the holding to denial of flat prohibitions against illegiti-
macy, it can be read as support for finding unreasonable any standard condemning crim-
inal activity outside the facilities or any minor violations of ordinary standards of de-
cency.
70 Williams v. Housing Auth., 223 Ga. 407, 155 S.E.2d 923 (1967).
71 See p. 1123 & note 10 supra.
72 PUBLIC HOUSING Is THE TENANTS, supra note 17, at 11.
73 Rosen, supra note 4, at 237.
74 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH, THE
NEGRO FAMILY-THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965) (The Moynihan Report), reprinted
in L. RAINWATER & W. YANCEY, supra note 10, at 4.
75 Letter of Nov. 13, 1967 from Jesse E. Spray, General Housing Manager of the
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, to Mr. Boyd Lemon of the ACLU of
Southern California, on file in the Cornell Law Library [hereinafter cited as Letter of
Jesse Spray].
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excluding by definition "a group of unrelated persons living to-
gether." 76 The argument is hardly convincing. Common law marriage
does not violate the goals of the public housing acts-although it may
conflict with the white middle-class morality of the administrators-
and is not an absolute impediment to admission in other jurisdictions.77
In states recognizing common law marriages, the relevant provision of
the annual contributions contract could be worded in a manner that
avoids discriminating against common law marriage.78
Present substantive standards are also questionable because they
lack specificity. Even where definite standards have been promulgated,
catchall sections are frequently included to give "legal" grounds for
reaching decisions thought desirable on their facts. For example, the
"dear and present danger" category of the New York City Housing
Authority's eligibility standards contains an "other evidence of behavior
which endangers life, safety or morals" provision.7 9 Although it may
only demonstrate excessive caution, the provision has great potential
for abuse. Similarly, the "nuisance" standard for evictions is open to
criticism; 0 i.e., definitions of such standards are likely to be either
legalistic or vague.8 ' Although management must protect other tenants
from deleterious individuals, an examination of past uses of the nui-
sance standard "raises disquieting doubts whether management has
restricted itself to dear-cut cases of gross misconduct."8' 2
Thus, existing standards make social desirability the key issue in
both admissions and evictions. The general tenor of the standards indi-
cates that management has adopted an attitude of choosing the best of
a bad lot. The ultimate result of this policy is exclusion of the very
people most in need of decent housing. That this group should be
76 Id.
77 A common law relationship where there is no impediment to marriage is treated
as a "condition indicative of potential problems" by the New York City Housing Au-
thority. GM-1287, supra note 59, at 5.
78 A common law marriage with children should satisfy the "group of two or more
persons regularly living together related by blood, marriage or adoption" standard, since
both parents are related to the children by blood.
79 GM-1287, supra note 39, at 3.
80 For the standards of the New York City Housing Authority's Tenant Review
Board, see note 31 supra.
81 Housing officials who have studied leasing procedures across the nation have
condemned the use of similar "legalese" in authority leases.
One is prompted to ask whether it is really necessary for a housing authority,
which has nine-tenths of the law on its side to begin with [to] have the legal
equivalent of a Sherman tank to protect it against a destitute and defenseless
tenant.
PUBLIC HoUsINo Is Tim TFrNTs, supra note 17, at 34.
82 Friedman, supra note 7, at 661.
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automatically ineligible reflects a definite need for a change in the rules.
Meaningful standards can be drawn only after examining the nature of
the problem family and reevaluating the proper role of public housing.
B. The Problem Family an d the _Role of Public fofpsjg-An
Experiment
Arguably, every slum family can be viewed as a problem family, As
products of a totally deficient environment, they can hardly be expected
to be anything else. a Some, however, have more problems than others:
(a) nearly a quarter of urban Negro marriages are dissolved; (b)
nearly one quarter of Negro births are now illegitimate; (c) as a
consequence, almost one fourth of Negro fa lies are-headed by
females, and (d) this breakdown of the Negr.o family has led to a
startling increase in welfare dependency.s4
These characteristics are reflected in the public housing pppulatip,
fifty-three percent of which is non-white.sA5 Typical problem family
difficulties are illegitimacy, alcoholism, records of arrest, undisciplined
children, and marital disharmony8 Present standards either deny ad-
mittance to families afflicted with such problems, pr, if they are publicly
housed when the trouble develops, will result in their .eyiction.
The argument in favor of such standards is that problem families
impair the suitability of public housing projects as an environment in
which low-income families can adopt middle-class values,87 Defenders
8, Inded, as physical rganisms sensitiye to and prpfourqdly in9uencel by their
surrounding environment, the human beings living in bad housing which is part
of a defunct neighborhood forming a part of a chaotic and ill-functioning dity,
as mpst of them are, respqnd as we might reasonably have predicted thenj to:
they throw up ambition, reject schools, engage in crime, allow their' family
structures to dissolve, abjure the values of the general society which we present
to them, and when the pressures of frustration mount in the presence of a
spark of organ zation, they riot. If we wish the bulk of our population to be-
come citizens who are both productive economically and sound politically, we
must contrive to place them in an environment which will naturally produce
such behavior.
Cogswell, Housiug, the Computer, and the Architectural Process, 32 LAJy & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 274 (1967).
84 L. RAINWATER & W. YANCEY, supra note 10, at 5.
85 5Q% are receiving assistance or benefits.
30% are elderly.
30% of the families With children are one-parent, broken families.
56% of all the families have moved in within the last five years.
82% of the elderly, and 25% of the non-elderly have no gainfully employed worker
in the family.
PUBLIC HoUSING Is THE TENANTS, supra note 17, at 11.
86 See Wirth, Point-of-Entry-Work, 14 J. HOUSING 127 (1957).
87 Mhe problem families must be denied admittance into the projects if the
projects are to become suitable places in which conscientious families can try
to break the barriers which the slums and poverty have placed between them
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of desirability as the test for public housing further argue, "It is clear
that a vast majority of the taxpayers, the housing authority officials and
particularly the occupants of the projects, want such a policy."18s
The argument could not be more wroig. Ori legal grounds, it can
be argued that public housing should start with the worst of the eligible
group, since they need help the most. At a minimum, federal equal
protection should requite admission of a fair cross section of the poot-
some good and some bad.89 Common sense demands the same result.
Families with problems are a part of every community and thus must
be expected to make up a part of the public housing population.90 For
nearly two decades, the view of responsible housing officials has been
that "[t]he problem cannot be eliminated by refusing to accept such
families-it can only be shifted to other areas of the community, Where
there would be even less regard a-id concern for their welfare."9 1 To
paraphrase Otie siach official, it is more important that problem families
be helped than that the local project be "succe.ssfui" in the sense of
consisting of only lower-class families-with middle-class valuesPublic
housing, therefore, should include a disproportioiately large number of
problem families, and part of the job of public housing is to demon-
strate that these problems cat be mitigated by better h6using.9J Public
housing is, in a large sense, a social experiment. Removing the barrier
to admittance of the problem family need not result in deterioration of
the social structure of the project. Although defenders of the present
standards hypothecate that the high turnover rate in public housing is
due in large measure to the presence of problem families,) the adrgu-
ment has no substance in fact. A 1958 survey by the Public Housing
Administration found the major reason for moving out of public hous-
ing to be dissatisfaction With space.94 Further, the pr6ceedings at a
and the rest of society. The alcoholics, the drug addicts, families with proved
propensities for trouble and delinquency, and uhwed mothers who show no signs
of reform, must be barred. Ivory-tower critics seldom mention this as a possible
remedy to many of the public housing difficulties because, at first glance, it seems
a bit cruel. But there is no alternative if we sincerely want a housing program
which can answer the social, as well as economic, needs of these low-income per-
sons.
Ledbetter, Public Housing-A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 LAw & CoNTEmP;
PROB. 490, 522 (1967).
88 Id.
89 See Harvith, supra note 451 at 240.
90 Hartman, First "Problem Family" Step, 14 J. Housin G 118 (1957).
91 Id.
92 Wirth, How Much "Selectidni" 8 J. HdusING 91 (1951). See alsb Jenkins, "Problem
Families," 8 J. HousIN 283 (1951).
93 Ledbetter, supra note 87, at 508.
94 PuBLIc HousING Is THE TENANTS, supra note 17, at 27.
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White House conference indicate that the major cause of tenant dis-
satisfaction is the inhumane treatment they receive at the hands of local
authorities-particularly the mistreatment both of mothers of illegiti-
mate children and of tenants joining in community action.9 5
Thus, both housing officials and tenants recognize the need to re-
evaluate the role of public housing in light of the problem family.
Public housing presents a unique opportunity for a concerted effort by
all welfare agencies to work on problem families.9 6 The National Asso-
ciation of Housing and Redevelopment Officials has already recognized
the necessity of this change of position:
[T]he original goals of public housing have undergone a vast
change.... The social changes of the past twenty-five years have
cast public housing in a new role: that of furnishing decent, low-
cost living quarters for a typical population of elderly people and
troubled or troublesome families. The trend for coming years
certainly seems to be toward an increase of the social service role
of housing authorities. 97
The trend coincides with a general reevaluation and redirection of
domestic social policy towards reaching the family unit instead of the
individual.98 What better opportunity could there be than a public
housing project for testing the effect of extensive social services on those
persons farthest removed from the mainstream of American life? But
no valuable social service program can be instituted until eligibility
and eviction standards which do not discriminate against problem
families are formulated and adopted.
C. Proposed Standards-Limits on Housing Authority Discretion
The eligibility standards of the New York City Housing Au-
thority99 are perhaps the most detailed in the nation, but their emphasis
on desirability as the test of admission is inapposite to the reevaluated
role of public housing. Their usefulness is further restricted by the
adoption of catchall standards. 0 0 Moreover, the adoption of more pre-
cise standards for eligibility than for evictions, although antisocial con-
duct is the bane of each, is an unjustifiable grant of discretion in the
95 Id. at 5. The name of the conference, held in June, 1966, was "To Secure These
Rights."
96 Borland, Slums of the Mind, 14 J. HoUSING 124 (1957).
97 Conclusion of a report of the Syracuse University Youth Development Center,
adopted in PUBULc HOUSING Is THE TENANTS, supra note 17, at 11 (emphasis added).
98 See Moynihan, A Family Policy for the Nation, 113 AmamucA, Sept. 18, 1965, at
280, 282.
99 See p. 1129 supra.
100 See p. 1133 supra.
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tenant review branch of the authority.101 Standards both reasonable and
specific should be applicable to both eligibility and eviction determina-
tions.
1. Proposed Standards of A CLU of Southern California
The ACLU of Southern California has attempted to promulgate
such standards, but its efforts have been rebuffed by the Los Angeles
Housing Authority.0 2 Examination of the proposed standards, the Au-
thority's objections thereto, and the existing standards of the New York
City Housing Authority facilitates the determination of workable
standards that should be acceptable to a socially conscious authority.
The ACLU proposal is concise and is properly preceded by a state-
ment that its standards are to be "interpreted and enforced flexibly so
as to qualify applicants and retain tenants in housing .... -103 The
proposal then liberally defines "nuisance" in terms of serious mis-
behavior. 04 Conduct constituting a continued nuisance is grounds for
eviction or denial under both the ACLU proposal' 0 5 and the New York
City standards. 08 But the potential for abuse inherent in this standard
and the apparent inability on the part of authorities to avoid confound-
ing their tenants with meaningless legalese require elimination of the
nuisance standard.
The next section of the ACLU proposals defines conduct that shall
not constitute grounds for eviction or ineligibility:
(a) Common law marriage or illegal or nonlegal family relation-
ships;
(b) Illegitimacy of children;
(c) Conviction of a misdemeanor;
(d) Any arrest or criminal proceeding which did not conclude in
conviction of a felony;
(e) Felony convictions which do not suggest a continuing pattern
of personal misbehavior seriously inimical to health, safety or
morals;
101 Compare the detailed eligibility standards discussed at p. 1129-34 supra with
the more general eviction standards in note 16 supra.
102 11 ,VELvARE LAW BULL. 6 (Jan. 1968).
103 ACLU of Southern California, Proposed Regulations for the Housing Authority
of the City of Los Angeles § 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited ACLU Proposal].
104 [C]onduct in public which is debasing in character and debauching in its
influence on public morals, serious and continued disturbance of the peace of
the project, seriously injurious to health or safety, substantial interference with
the enjoyment or use of property or severe destruction of property.
Id. § 2.
105 Id. § 4(c).
106 See notes 15-16 supra.
1968] 1137
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
(f Failure of a wife or putative wife to file for divorce, separate
maintenance or failure to provide when her husband or puta-
tive husband has abandoned the family; or
(g) Other conduct which, although not conduct of an exemplary
citizen, does not seriously jeopardize the health, morals or safety
of the project. 0 7
The objection of the Los Angeles Housing Authority to subsection
(a)-common law relationships-is discussed above. 08 The statutory
definition of "family" is satisfied in states recognizing common law
marriage, and consequently its use as a standard cannot be justified.
Subsection (f) is basically concerned with financial requirements and, as
such, is beyond the scope of this note.
No objection is made to subsection (b). Any illegitimacy standard
violates the goals of public housing.0 As conduct not seriously jeopar-
dizing the health, safety or morals of the project, illegitimacy should be
irrelevant. The New York City Housing Authority treats illegitimacy
as an indicator of a "potential problem." The Los Angeles Hopsing
Authority does not object to subsection (g). This fact further discredits
the New York City Housing Authority's insistence on a category of
"Conditions Indicative of Potential Problems." Although technically
not a denial of eligibility, relegation of problem families to a "further
evaluation" status is equivalent to a rejection. The existence of the
"potential' problems" category indicates recognition by the authority
that no imminent danger lurks therein. Thus, the only possible use of
such a category is the elimination of troublesome families, an unreason-
able result in light of the reevaluated role of public housing. The
entire "potential problem' category should be eliminated.
The objection to proposed subsections (c), (d), and (e), concerning
law breaking, is that an all-inclusive listing of offenses to be used to
determine eligibility or eviction does not give proper weight to the
"many instances where an accumulation of minor offenses can easily
be seen by an interviewer to add up to an unsatisfactory neighbor or
tenant."" 0° This might be paraphrased, "In our view, regardless of iyhap
the police, the courts of law, or the probation authorities say, you look
like trouble-and we don't want families who might cause trouble."
This attitude is responsible for many of the problems in public
107 ACLTJ Proposal § 3.
108 See discussion at pp. 1132-33 supra.
1o9 See p. - supra.
110 Letter of Jesse Spray, supra note 75, at 2.
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hodsing."' By acdepting such families, social welfare agencies will be
afforded a unique opportunity to reduce these minor conflicts with the
law.
Settion 4 of the proposal delimits conduct whith may constitute
grourds for eviction or denial:
(a) Continued drunkenness resulting iri the serious disturbance of
tieighbors;
(b) Failure to provide adequiate supetvi siori for minor children
allowing them to comiit acts Which seriously jeopardize the
health, safety or morals of the project;
(t) Tenants who constitute a continued nuisance;
(d) Conviction of a felony which suggests a continuihg pattern of
personal actions which reasonably cduld jeopardize the health,
safety or morAls of the project including, without limitation,
rape, child molestation or othe' such felonies; or
(e) Other similar conduct Which would jeopardize the health,
morals, afrty or welfare of the project; or
(f) Delinquent rent payment record, ekcessiv'e income or assets,
improper or poor mainteiiance of the apartmefit ertrusted to
him and other similar factors.112
This section is overwritten. Although more concise than the New York
City Housing Authority's eviction standards,"13 the emphasis on gross
misuse of the facilities can be stated more succinctly One section should
cover any form of repeated disorderly behavior which seriously disturbs
neighbors or seriously endangers the property of the authority. This
precludes the need for a nuisance standard. Separate treatment should
be accorded child misbehavior since it is important that the parents
of the problem child be fully aware of the implications of misconduct.
Like minor offenses, child misconduct is an excellent target for exten-
sive social services. Thus, anything short of incorrigibility should not be
a violation of the standard.
The basic objection to subsections (d) and (e) is that they should
not be viewed as all-inclusive.114 By their terms, ample leeway exists
to include serious breaches not specifically treated. The "clear and
present danger" category of the New York City Housing Authority
111 See New York City Housing Auth. v. Watson, 27 Misc. 2d 618, 623, 267 N.Y.S.2d
920, 926 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (dissenting opinion of Hofstadter, J.).
112 ACLU Proposal § 4.
113 See note 16 supra.
1i4 Letter of Jese Spray, supra note 75, at 8.
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includes an "illegal occupations" standard which condemns prostitutes,
narcotics peddlers, professional gamblers, and zip gun makers or
sellers.115 It is difficult to see how prostitution or professional gambling
carried on outside the project could seriously jeopardize the health,
safety, morals or welfare of the tenants. Under the ACLU standards,
such activities would properly be the subject of social service agencies.
The last standard is generally beyond the scope of this note, but
apartment maintenance and "other similar factors" deserve attention.
The slum family cannot be expected to adopt good housekeeping stan-
dards automatically. Thus, only "continual" improper maintenance
should merit eviction. It is unclear what the phrase "other similar
factors" is intended to cover. To facilitate interpretation by the tenant
and to avoid possible abuse, the phrase should be deleted.
Section 5 of the proposal sets a two-year (or two dwelling places,
whichever is less) "statute of limitations" concerning evidence of fitness
of the applicant. 16 Two pertinent arguments are raised against this
section by the authority. A person found ineligible on a prior occasion
could, in quick succession, have two dwelling places and during this
time have no antisocial conduct. He would be eligible under the ACLU
standard."7 The two-year standard seems reasonable, and, therefore,
should be sufficient. The authority also contends that applicants and
former tenants should be treated separately."" But unless the former
tenant was evicted, there is no basis for separate treatment. If evicted,
however, the authority should be allowed to examine his past conduct
from the time of termination."
2. Proposed Standards Facilitating Admission of Problem Fam-
ilies
A formulation of reasonable standards giving full effect to the suit-
ability of public housing for social experiment is now possible:
PROPOSED SUBSTANTIVE (NON FINANCIAL) STANDARDS FOR USE
IN DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY AND EVICTION
1. The following regulations shall be interpreted and enforced
so as to qualify applicants and retain tenants in housing under the
programs of the authority.
115 GM-1287, supra note 39, at 2.
116 ACLU Proposal § 5.
117 Letter of Jesse Spray, supra note 75, at 3.
118 Id.
319 A concluding section of the ACLU proposal attempts to establish procedural
rules for denials of admission. See discussion at pp. 1123-27 supra, concerning the de-
mands of due process in this area.
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2. The following shall not constitute grounds for evicting a ten-
ant or denying housing to an applicant;
(a) Common law marriage or illegal or nonlegal family relation-
ship; or
(b) Illegitimate children; or
(c) Any arrest or criminal proceeding which did not conclude in
a felony conviction; or
(d) Felony convictions which do not suggest a continuing pattern
of personal misbehavior seriously inimical to public health,
safety and morals; or
(e) Other conduct which does not seriously jeopardize the health,
safety or morals of the project.
3. The following conduct may constitute grounds for eviction of
a tenant or denial of an applicant;
(a) Repeated disorderly behavior resulting in the gross misuse
of project property or serious imposition upon neighbors; 120 or
(b) Failure to provide adequate supervision for minor children
whose conduct shows a continuing pattern of acts which seri-
ously jeopardize the health, safety or morals of the project; or
(c) A felony conviction suggesting a continuing pattern of per-
sonal actions which reasonably could jeopardize the health,
safety or morals of the project including, without limitation,
rape, child molestation or other such felonies; or
(d) Continued grossly improper maintenance of the apartment
entrusted to him resulting in conditions inimical to the health
or safety of the project.
4. An applicant shall not be denied housing on grounds of his
past conduct in other housing if his conduct during the two years prior
to his application does not constitute grounds for denial under these
regulations. Where the applicant is a former public housing tenant and
was evicted under these regulations, the authority may examine past
conduct dating from such eviction or for two years whichever is longer.
120 This standard replaces the vague and confusing "nuisance" standard.
In view of the nature of public housing the authority has little cause for legal
action against tenants except to: (1) recover the premises in case of non-payment
of rent, (2) remove the family for cause such as gross misuse of property or im-
position [upon] neighbors, (3) removal for non-eligibility such as income above
the maximum.
PUBLIc HOUSING IS THE TENANTs, supra note 17, at 34.
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III
CONCLUSION
Mere formulation of substantive standards without their adoption
by the agencies of public housing is of little significance. In light of
the express policy of Congress to vest maximum discretion in local
authorities, implementation at the national level is improbable. It is
the task of public opinion to convince the local authorities of the
efficacy of standards that give greater dignity to public housing ten-
ants and a broader scope to the public housing program. Informed and
concerned lawyers, through work with tenant organizations and bar
association committeeg, can and must play an important role in aWaken-
ing and applying public opinion.
Brian F., Tdohey
